The pretext supply chain: remove one source and it reroutes
It Looked Routine. It Was the Attack.
A 2025 joint CISA and FBI advisory on the Scattered Spider group described targeted approaches prepared through open-source and commercial reconnaissance. This second of two threat-doctrine briefs, following CB-105, asks why a request built that way reads as routine to a careful recipient, and how exposure-reduction work against it should be measured. Built from the advisory and deception-detection research, and kept at the defensive level. For those responsible for a principal's protection and for evaluating removal programs.
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Pretext assembly
An approach is built from small true details gathered across sources, so it reads as routine.
More on deceive and engineer →- Mechanism · Acquire and collectRe-acquisition after removal. Removed records persist or return: holders ignore requests, re-acquire from upstream sources or resale partners, or lapse once suppression is not held.
- Mechanism · Deceive and engineerApproach through the circle. The adversary reaches a principal through staff, family, advisors or friends who hold access or trust.